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Policy Entrepreneurs and Change Strategies: Lessons from Sixteen Case
Studies of Water Transitions around the Globe
Sander Meijerink 1 and Dave Huitema 2
ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on the role of policy entrepreneurs in realizing water policy transitions.
The central questions are to what extent have policy entrepreneurs played a role in realizing major change
in water policies, who are these policy entrepreneurs, and what strategies have they used to bring about
change? The policy science literature suggests that policy entrepreneurs have an "arsenal" of possible
strategies for achieving change. Based on a comparative analysis of water policy changes in 15 countries
around the globe and the European Union, we investigate which strategies have in practice been used by
policy entrepreneurs, to what effect, and which lessons for managing water transitions we can draw from
this. The comparative case analysis shows that individuals play complementary roles; hence,
entrepreneurship in water management is often collective entrepreneurship. Strategies of coalition building,
the manipulation of decision making forums, and the strategic framing of issues and windows are crucial
to understanding water policy change, which suggests that the management of water policy transitions is
a highly political game. We conclude by listing recommendations for those who would like to direct water
policy change.
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INTRODUCTION
In the introduction to this special feature we
developed a typology of strategies that policy
entrepreneurs can potentially use to realize water
policy transitions, which we equate with major
changes in water policies. This article presents the
results of 16 in-depth analyses of the role of policy
entrepreneurs in realizing major change in national
water policies (Huitema and Meijerink 2010). For
each of these transitions, we assess whether or not
radical policy change was indeed affected by
individuals, and if individuals did play a role, which
strategies they have used to affect change. The
purpose of this article is to refine the typology that
was presented in the introduction to this special
feature, and to explore the possibility of a more
generic theory of change strategies. One question
of interest then is how much do the particular
institutional arrangements either facilitate or rule
out different types of strategy, or can we identify
similarities among cases that indicate where and
when certain types of policy entrepreneurs and
strategies might be successful?
The analysis presented here goes beyond the four
country studies presented in this special feature. In
Huitema and Meijerink (2009a), we present 11
additional country studies along with an analysis of
water transitions in the European Union (EU).
Together, these 16 accounts of major change in
water policies provide a solid empirical basis for
investigating the role of policy entrepreneurs in
realizing water policy transitions. What kind of
transitions did we observe in these 15 countries and
the EU? We found examples of both substantive
transitions, such as the transition from structural
flood defense to integrated flood risk management,
and governance transitions, such as the privatization
of water services, decentralization, and the move to
more participatory forms of governance. It is
important to reiterate that our interest was in the
adaptability of political systems. Therefore, our
interest was in explaining the role of policy
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entrepreneurs in realizing major policy change
irrespective of the direction of that change; hence,
the transitions analyzed do not necessarily
contribute to a more sustainable management of
water resources. Table 1 gives an overview of the
transitions analyzed in the various countries and the
European Union.
The water transitions analyzed involve strongly
diverging contexts, some arising in low-income
countries, others in middle-income or high-income
countries. Some occurred in democracies and others
in semi-democracies or authoritarian regimes. That
is why the most different systems approach, as
described in the introduction to this special feature,
can be applied. If we consistently find a connection
between the activity of policy entrepreneurs and
major policy change across such diverse contexts,
this supports our hypothesis that policy
entrepreneurs play a crucial role in realizing water
policy transitions. In this article, we first reflect on
the patterns of continuity and change in the various
case studies, and the difference between the
adoption and implementation of new policies. Next,
we confirm that policy entrepreneurs were involved
in all transitions analyzed here, and we discuss the
types of policy entrepreneurs who have played a
role in the cases studied. This leads to questions such
as were they individuals or organizations, and to
what extent were they able to make a difference?
Are policy subsystems changed from within, that is,
by governmental bureaucracies and/or elected
politicians, or by “outsiders”, such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)and scientists?
We then address the central questions of our
research: What strategies have policy entrepreneurs
used to realize water transitions, and have these
strategies been successful? What strategies are used
to block transitions, and have they been successful?
And how does the institutional context constrain or
enable the activities of policy entrepreneurs? We
conclude by summarizing the main lessons learned
from the various examples of policy entrepreneurship
featured in the case studies, and addressing both
potential pitfalls and possibilities for improving the
chances for a successful navigation of water
transitions (see also Olsson et al. 2006).
CHANGE ON PAPER VERSUS CHANGE ON
THE GROUND
Various theories of the policy process, such as the
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1993),
punctuated-equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and
Jones 1991), and historical institutionalism (for
example, Pierson 2000), distinguish between major,
radical, or paradigmatic policy change and
incremental or shallower forms of policy change.
The countries studied all demonstrate policy
dynamics and offer clear examples of major change
embodied in either the content of water policies or
in the overarching governance paradigm. One of the
lessons from the 16 case studies, however, is that
even though such radically new policies may have
been adopted, they have neither replaced existing
policies entirely nor have they been implemented
fully. te Boekhorst et al. (2010), analyzing the
introduction of integrated river basin management
(IRBM) in China, conclude that “The introduction
and implementation of IRBM as a new paradigm
can be regarded as the emergence of resistance to
the Chinese hydrological mission and its unintended
consequences. However the ongoing execution of
large hydro-engineering projects indicates a
competition between two paradigms and an
outcome that has still to be determined.” Ingram and
Lejano (2009), writing on U.S. water policies,
similarly argue that existing ways of knowing water
are persistent even when alternative framings
(meanings) of water issues are introduced. In
addition, the case studies of flood management in
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), Germany (Becker
2009), and the Netherlands (Huitema and Meijerink
2009b) all demonstrate how newly adopted policies
of ecosystem-based water management and flood
risk management put pressure on stable policy
communities, but in none of these cases has the
“old” hydrologic paradigm of fighting the water by
regulating rivers and constructing dikes disappeared
completely. Rather, in some cases, policy
entrepreneurs tried to integrate, combine, or balance
the “old” engineering and “new” ecological
approaches, while others actively attempted to
frustrate the change in direction.
The same tension between newly adopted and
existing policies can be observed in the case studies
of governance transitions. Although many newly
adopted policies emphasize the need for stakeholder
and public participation in water management,
many governance practices are still based on more
traditional modes of governance. The Thai and
Tanzanian examples show how new rules and
procedures overlaid existing local institutions
without replacing them and without formally
addressing the way in which they were supposed to
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Table 1. Substantive and governance transitions analyzed in the case studies presented.
Country/region Transition analyzed Source
Substantive transitions
United States Transition from single purpose to integrated water resources
management
Ingram and Lejano (2009)
China Transition from hydraulic paradigm to ecosystem-based water
management
te Boekhorst et al. (2010)
Thailand Transitions from:
 
l
 diversion in wet seasons only to all year-round irrigation
 
l
 giving priority to farming to giving priority to urban and
industrial users
 
l
 emphasis on consumable quantities of water to the service-
rendering quality of water
 
Lebel et al. (2009)
Australia Transitions from:
 
l
 economic water use only to environmental water allocation
 
l
 unregulated to regulated ground water use
 
Hughes and McKay (2009)
South Africa Transition from extraction and pollution of mining water to pollution
prevention
Turton (2009)
Hungary Transition from hydraulic paradigm to ecosystem-based river
management
Werners et al. (2010)
Spain Transition from supply-based water management to demand
management
Font and Subirats (2010)
Germany Transitions from a traditional technocratic safety discourse to an
ecological risk perspective
Becker (2009)
The Netherlands Transition from hydraulic paradigm (construction of dams and dikes)
to space for the river and river restoration
Huitema and Meijerink
(2009b)
Governance transitions
Mexico Privatization (creation of water markets, introduction of water
pricing), decentralization, introduction of participatory governance
(establishment of water user associations)
Wilder (2010)
India Decentralization, introduction of participatory governance
(establishment of water user associations)
Narain (2009)
(con'd)
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Indonesia Decentralization, introduction of participatory governance
(establishment of water user associations)
Bhat and Mollinga (2009)
Tanzania Privatization, decentralization, introduction of participatory
governance (establishment of water user associations)
Goldin and Kibassa (2009)
European Union Marketization (introduction principles of full cost recovery and water
pricing), introduction of participatory governance (public
participation, stakeholder participation)
Partzsch (2009)
Turkey Privatization of water services, decentralization, introduction of
participatory governance (establishment of water user associations)
Kibaroglu et al. (2009)
Sweden Transition from non-adaptive towards adaptive institutions Olsson and Galaz (2009)
interact (Goldin and Kibassa 2009, Lebel et al.
2009). As a consequence, prior institutions persist
and sometimes continue to dominate decision-
making processes, for example in areas where local
irrigation organizations are still active. In other
cases, such as in Indonesia, the management and
maintenance of irrigation systems was formally
decentralized, but the central government continued
to play a crucial role in funding and monitoring,
hence, continued to be a powerful actor in irrigation
management (Bhat and Mollinga 2009).
These observations underscore the need to
conceptualize policy transitions as a multiple step
process: there is a difference between changing
policies on paper and changing policies on the
ground. It is well known from the literature that even
if formal policies change radically, implementation
constitutes a new round in the policy game, where
established routines are often less amenable to
change. Several case studies illustrate this dynamic,
since opponents of policy change have often
successfully blocked the implementation of
radically changed policy.
It is possible, of course, that “old” substantive and
governance paradigms or discourses will be
replaced entirely in the long run, but many of the
transitions that we have studied have not yet reached
that stage and may never reach it. Indeed, in many
countries, such as Thailand (Lebel et al. 2009) and
Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009), it may not be
desirable for former practices and concepts to
disappear completely. Integration of valuable new
and old components might well form an element of
a transition towards more sustainable water
management.
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS
Introduction
The authors of the case studies were asked to use an
agency perspective, that is, to find out who is behind
the changes observed and to focus on the roles and
strategies of the individuals or organizations so
identified. The various case studies provide ample
evidence for the crucial role of key individuals and
organizations in realizing transitions. Individual
policy entrepreneurs stood out as agents of change
in many cases, but it proved difficult to pinpoint
individuals in the case studies on China, Thailand,
South Africa, Tanzania, and the EU. In the latter
cases, the analysis focused primarily on the roles
and strategies of organizations. This occurred for
various reasons. Firstly, the social science training
of some of the authors focuses on organizations and
collectives, leading to inexperience or even unease
with analyzing the role of individuals and presenting
detailed accounts of their strategic behavior.
Secondly, some authors faced a substantive
difficulty in that entrepreneurship is often a
collective undertaking, where a small group of
individuals navigates a transition, each representing
different organizations and playing a different role.
An additional complicating factor in identifying key
individuals comes with “the politics of claiming
success”. If a transition is generally perceived as
successful, many parties and persons will claim
responsibility for the success. Because the
reputations of individuals and sometimes also
powerful organizations are at stake, the claiming of
success is a political game. Success may well be
attributed to those most adept at playing the media.
The contribution of those lacking the necessary
promotional skills may be thought less important
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for a particular transition. For this reason, the case
studies draw largely on document analysis and
multiple interviews with individuals who played a
key role in the transition process (methodological
triangulation). Existing accounts of policy change,
as available for the Netherlands for instance, proved
instrumental in this way. The consideration of
someone, some organization, or some group as key
in either realizing or blocking change receives
support when both documents and a majority of
respondents refer to the same person, organization,
or group, thus increasing the credibility of the
findings.
Individual policy entrepreneurs
The observations on our cases corroborate
Kingdon’s thesis that individual policy entrepreneurs
can be found anywhere (Kingdon 1995), including
within governmental bureaucracies, political
parties, NGOs, or expert communities. These
individuals share a common willingness to invest
their resources (time, reputation, and/or knowledge)
in a particular proposal for policy change and
possess good networking skills. What is more, most
of these entrepreneurs demonstrated considerable
perseverance: they often worked on particular
transitions during significant parts of their career or
they had to make changes in their career to achieve
the transitions they sought.
Experts within the bureaucracy and the scientific
community have played a major role in all cases
studied. This is not surprising given the highly
technical nature of the water sector. Both the Dutch
and German case studies refer explicitly to the
potential for contribution to policy change by a “new
guard”, which is a group with a new, different
scientific-disciplinary background (in these cases,
biologists and ecologists) that has managed to
occupy crucial positions within research institutes
and governmental bureaucracies (Becker 2009,
Huitema and Meijerink 2009b).
Collective policy entrepreneurship
Although the cases illustrate the role of key
individuals as change agents or obstacles to change,
most cases also demonstrate the importance of
groups in successfully challenging the status quo.
Such groups often consist of representatives of
government agencies at various levels of
government, thus creating connections among
various scales and levels of decision-making,
NGOs, and/or research groups. Thus, most
entrepreneurship we found is collective. Collective
policy entrepreneurship holds two main advantages.
First, people in different positions may draw on a
different arsenal of strategies to influence a change
trajectory. Where experts working at either
governmental research institutes or universities
have excellent possibilities to develop and test new
ideas and approaches, senior policy advisors or
politicians generally are in a better position to help
achieve the adoption of new policies. Second,
people may have different capacities and skills
irrespective of their positions. Some have charisma
and are adept at explaining their vision to the media.
Others possess skills in developing new policy
concepts or in finding common ground with
multiple stakeholders.
Our cases confirm that shadow networks, formed
by actors operating on the fringes or outside the
formal circuits of power, are important for effecting
policy change. Huitema and Meijerink (2009b)
show that several officials working on alternative
approaches to water management in the Netherlands
had to do so with only silent support from their
superiors and eventually had to take jobs outside the
bureaucracy. A “shadow position” achieved in this
way gave them greater flexibility in advancing their
ideas. Similarly, ideas about radically different
approaches to water management were developed
in shadow networks of academics and NGOs in
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), Spain (Font and
Subirats 2010), and India (Narain 2009). Returning
to our first observation of the importance of
collectives in effecting transitions, we must
conclude that shadow networks are especially
important in the phase of idea development and, in
several cases, also in showing the applicability of
their ideas in principle through pilot projects. The
actual uptake of their ideas requires interaction with
the formal policy network and gives politicians,
former politicians, and high-ranked bureaucrats a
key role with their ability to translate the innovations
into new policy. This is consistent with the finding
of Olsson et al. (2006) that members of such shadow
networks develop and test new ideas in the shadow
of formal decision-making arenas but need to
develop links to formal decision networks to
successfully challenge a dominant policy paradigm.
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The special case of donor organizations
While entrepreneurial bureaucrats, politicians,
experts, or representatives of NGOs may play a role
in all countries, in low-income or middle-income
countries they are joined by another type of policy
entrepreneur in the form of the various international
donor organizations. Donor organizations, such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank, played a crucial role in shaping
water policy transitions in Indonesia (Bhat and
Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), Tanzania
(Goldin and Kibassa 2009), Thailand (Lebel et al.
2009), and Turkey (Kibaroglu et al. 2009). While
offering help for the resolution of financial crises or
capital for investment in the water sector, they also
attach conditions on national governments. Such
conditions often entail fundamental changes in
governance regimes, including privatization,
decentralization, and participatory governance (for
example, by the establishment of water user
associations in irrigation management). Funding
conditions are often in line with the paradigm of
integrated water resources management, but the
way in which some of these elements are
implemented varies greatly across the case studies.
In several cases, a perversion of notions such as
public participation and privatization can be
observed as elites use their control over the national
state to create advantages for themselves (see for
example Goldin and Kibassa (2009) on the
Tanzanian case).
THE STRATEGIES OF POLICY
ENTREPRENEURS
Introduction
How, then, did policy entrepreneurs realize change,
and what strategies have they used? Strategic
analysis always runs the risk of rationalization with
hindsight of the actions of the players involved. That
policy entrepreneurs were relevant in all countries
does not necessarily mean that all transitions were
plotted or the result of anticipatory and strategic
behavior. Often, transitions can only be nudged, not
managed. Policy entrepreneurs differ in their
awareness of decision processes at different levels
of governance and their capacity to act or intervene
at particular levels. The Spanish change coalition
did show such awareness, as they used the EU
venues to put pressure on the national government
(Font and Subirats 2010). In the Hungarian case,
however, the change agents had not developed a
strategy to link their ideas of ecosystem-based water
management to formal decision-making forums,
and the adoption of their plans resulted from a more
serendipitous process, which they did not
necessarily completely foresee (Werners et al.
2010).
Strategies for developing and disseminating
new ideas within multi-level governance
networks
Our set of cases shows striking similarities in the
ways in which water management issues are framed
and how transitions of a similar type are being
shaped in many countries around the globe.
International NGOs, such as the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF), have contributed to the
dissemination of the concepts of river restoration
and river basin management. These observations
bring to mind the analogy made by Richardson
(2000) between policy ideas and viruses. Just like
viruses or memes, some policy ideas and discourses
are contagious and spread around the globe.
However, different types of policy entrepreneurs
have clearly used variegating sets of strategies to
spread these ideas. Donor organizations are able to
mandate change through the formulation of strict
funding conditions, including demands for
governance transitions. Organizations such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
have been particularly successful in disseminating
the ideas of privatization and decentralization of
water management (Gupta 2009). It is not a
coincidence that countries such as Turkey
(Kibaroglu et al. 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010),
India (Narain 2009), Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa
2009), and Indonesia (Bhat and Mollinga 2009) all
present examples of efforts to privatize and
decentralize water and irrigation policies. It may be
argued that in these countries the national
governments actually had little choice but to change
their governance paradigm. It should be noted,
however, that there are certain instances where
government elites on the national and regional
levels gain personal benefits, in the form of both
influence and new job opportunities, from funding
by international donor organizations (for example,
Goldin and Kibassa 2009).
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Various case studies lead to serious questions
regarding the effectiveness or even appropriateness
of externally and centrally enforced forms of top-
down transitions. The Tanzanian case study serves
as an interesting example of how colonists in the
past introduced a new system of water management
that destroyed much of the adaptive capacity
embedded in local and tribal networks (Goldin and
Kibassa 2009). Cynics might argue that this
colonialism is not over yet because the studies of
transitions in India (Narain 2009), Indonesia (Bhat
and Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), and
Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009), and of EU
external water policies (Partzsch 2009) demonstrate
how western countries continue to implement their
western-developed models of “good governance”
in a non-western context. Indeed, various
international water and governance discourses
reveal a general pattern of the uploading of ideas
developed in the western world to the international
level and their subsequent downloading in other
parts of the world (Gupta 2009).
The strategy that donor organizations use to
influence national water policies is entirely different
from the strategies that most other policy
entrepreneurs, possessing different resources to
influence decision-making processes, tend to use.
What these policy entrepreneurs have in common
with donor organizations is that they carry a
particular set of ideas, whether it is a belief in the
merits of water markets, water pricing, participatory
governance, or ecosystem-based river management,
and undertake efforts to get these ideas realized.
However, whereas donor organizations are in a
position to impose policy change through the
formulation of conditions to funding, most other
policy entrepreneurs need to gain attention for and
attract supporters to their ideas first. Small-scale
pilot projects are often used to demonstrate the
feasibility and benefits of their newly proposed
approaches. Examples include the Bokartisz
coalition of municipalities and pilot sites for
floodplain rehabilitation in the Bodrogköz area in
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), WWF and wetland
restoration in Dongting Lake in China (te Boekhorst
et al. 2010), and the authors of the Plan Stork and
nature development along the Dutch main rivers
(Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Policy entrepreneurs
in these cases used the media to communicate the
results of such projects, to disseminate their ideas,
and to change people’s perceptions and mental
models (Olsson and Galaz 2009).
Almost all transitions suffer from implementation
problems, which are usually caused by a
conservative bureaucracy that wants to maintain the
status quo. The transitions instigated from the
international level encounter problems in “scaling
down”. Especially when they are meant to empower
local parties, water user associations, etc., they will
be treated with hostility by the bureaucracy. There
is a qualitative difference between transitions
towards privatization and transitions towards
decentralization and river restoration. The latter
types of transitions tend to run into greater
implementation problems (Indonesia, India,
Hungary are cases in point) than the first (see the
description of transitions in Mexico (Wilder 2010)
and Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009). This
difference may have something to do with the fact
that privatization is more easily implemented in a
way that is beneficial to the ruling elite.
Whether or not implementation difficulties can be
overcome depends on political support from top
leaders and from the institutional environment these
leaders operate in. In both the Chinese and Indian
transitions, support from high political leaders was
present and important for creating changes on the
workshop floor level (Narain 2009, te Boekhorst et
al. 2010), but the Chinese institutional structure is
more centralized and thus offers greater chance of
actual implementation once such support is
guaranteed. It should be noted, however, that even
under the most favorable conditions, most policy
changes remain “partial transitions” in the sense that
old and new policies tend to coexist in most
countries. In this respect, it is interesting to note how
many recent ideas for river restoration and
institutional design are inspired by ancient ways of
water management that are still practiced in niches
(take the Hungarian, Dutch, German, and Thai
examples). Under the “hydraulic mission” of
canalization, damming, etc., such ways were often
more or less forgotten or moved to the fringe, but
they have recently regained prominence as more
sustainable water management approaches.
Building coalitions: balancing between
advocacy and brokerage
This brings us to the strategies for gaining support
for new ideas and building successful coalitions and
alliances. In the country studies, we see three types
of coalitions. First, a coalition can be made up of
those who share the same or very similar ideas,
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beliefs, and values. They share either a common
disciplinary background, that is, they may be part
of an epistemic community, or they share certain
ideas, beliefs, and convictions unrelated to any
particular discipline. Typical examples include
environmentalist or pro-development coalitions,
which we, for example, have seen in the Netherlands
case study. The primary activity of such a coalition
is advocacy of a particular set of ideas, as in the
Netherlands case, ideas of ecosystem-based and
greener water policies. Premised on a stance at once
ontological and epistemological, similarities in
belief systems or shared meanings, are found to be
the binding element of these coalitions.
A second type of coalition, which elsewhere we
have called a strategic alliance (Meijerink 2005), is
a coalition between parties who do not share the
same policy beliefs, value preferences, or world
views; nevertheless, they share an interest in
realizing a particular sort of policy change. Partzsch
(2009), in her account of the development of the EU
Water Framework Directive, describes how the
water industry and environmental NGOs joined
forces because they shared an interest in water
pricing, although for entirely different reasons.
Whereas the drinking water companies hoped to
benefit financially from this governance transition,
the environmentalists wanted to ameliorate surface
water quality and to restore water ecosystems. The
Netherlands case quite similarly shows how a
coalition of fishermen, who tried to safeguard their
income, and environmentalists, who wanted to
preserve the estuarine ecosystem, formed a
successful alliance that opposed plans to close an
estuary (Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Finally,
Font and Subirats (2010) show how economists,
environmentalists, and (water) donor regions, each
with different beliefs, interests, and ways of
knowing water, jointly opposed the traditional
supply-based engineering approach in Spain.
A third type of coalition includes parties who neither
share beliefs or problem perceptions nor policy
preferences but are simply dependent on each other
for realizing their diverging objectives. Policy
transition is incidental to the successful
achievement of the separate goals of the coalition
members. While shared beliefs or meanings and
shared policy objectives form the glue that binds
advocacy coalitions and strategic alliances,
respectively, resource dependence forms the
rationale behind this third coalition type. Successful
change agents clearly have an eye for the
preferences and desires of other parties and try to
meet their demands, winning support for their
proposals in the process. For example, WWF
managed to gain support for ecosystem restoration
projects in China by addressing the economic needs
of the local population at the same time (te
Boekhorst et al. 2010). Coalition building among
parties with different value priorities and policy
objectives often entails processes of negotiation and
compromise, similar to the formation of a coalition
government in a multi-party system. Successful
policy entrepreneurs, therefore, have to balance
continuously on the continuum between advocacy
and brokerage (Kingdon 1995). On the one hand,
they must be good advocates of specific concepts.
They need to be able to communicate their ideas and
message in an appealing and convincing way. On
the other hand, they need the skills to negotiate and
cooperate with those who have different ideas,
world views, or interests but who possess crucial
resources. Expanding on our finding that successful
entrepreneurship is often collective entrepreneurship,
the cases presented show that different persons may
play complementary roles: while some may excel
in generating new ideas, others are particularly
skilled in advocating those ideas, and still others
have the capacity to broker or negotiate.
Policy entrepreneurs can also benefit by
understanding the importance of building networks
across different “ways of knowing” water (Ingram
and Lejano 2009). Boundary organizations or key
individuals can play a crucial role in connecting
various ways in which water issues are framed,
thereby inserting new values and perspectives. For
example, Olsson and Galaz (2009), in their Sweden
case study, explain how a key individual managed
to change the perception of politicians from seeing
wetlands as a problem (“water sick”) to seeing them
as a valuable resource (“water rich”). The policy
entrepreneur in question did so by developing and
applying landscape-level solutions to environmental
problems, solutions originated by networks, and by
linking proposals to additional goals such as
regional development. Where Ingram and Lejano
point to the usefulness of brokering between (or
connecting) various ways of knowing, Narain
(2009) and Lebel et al. (2009) insightfully show how
discursive strategies may also be used strategically
by both advocates of change and those who try to
block it. Such discursive strategies can be used to
attract supporters to new policy proposals and to
justify policy interventions. Lebel et al. (2009)
distinguish between various powerful framings,
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such as the “drought narrative”, the “forests make
water narrative”, and the “living with the river
narrative”. In their study of policy change in the
Upper Ping Basin, they found that adherence to such
narratives formed a key strategy for individuals
wishing to promote and secure policy changes.
Players in the transition would, for example, try to
fit new policy ideas into existing narratives, or
conversely, appeal to such narratives to oppose
change. Their analysis also demonstrates how the
very same narrative used to promote one particular
water transition can be used as a counter-narrative
to block another water transition.
Anticipating, manipulating, and exploiting
windows of opportunity
Coalition building and shared meaning making,
however, are not sufficient for realizing change.
Policy entrepreneurs need opportunities to launch
their ideas. The case studies repeatedly illustrate the
importance of windows of opportunity in water
policy transitions. Table 2 gives an overview of
some of the key windows that were found to be of
relevance in the case studies.
Several examples exist of policy entrepreneurs who
successfully exploited crises. Media coverage of
environmental emergencies, like sea or river floods,
periods of extreme drought, or cases of accidental
pollution, raises public awareness, thus increasing
political attention to specific water problems. Both
public and political attention to an issue offers
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to gain
support for new insights, policy proposals, and
policy directions. The river floods in Hungary
(1998, 2001), Germany (2002), Thailand (2005),
and China (1998), and the sea (1953) and river
floods (1993 and 1995) in the Netherlands all
offered windows of opportunity to launch or
articulate ideas of ecosystem-based water
management and of creating more space for the
water.
As can be easily appreciated from the literature
(Birkland 1997, Boin et al. 2009), the framing of
such flood events is a crucial strategy here. In the
Netherlands case, the river floods mentioned above
could either be framed as a sign that insufficient
resources had been allocated for realizing and
maintaining structural flood defenses or as a sign
that the policy paradigm of controlling the water
with technical infrastructure had failed. The (near)
river floods of 1993 and 1995 and the resulting
large-scale evacuation of residents dramatically
increased awareness of water issues and policy.
Although new plans for creating more space for the
river had been developed in the early 1990s, the
floods actually threatened to reinforce former
policies. The Ministry of Traffic and Water
Management, with strong support from the Dutch
parliament, was very determined to make rapid
improvements to the weaker points in the dykes,
even if this meant sacrificing attractive landscapes.
Alternative ideas received relatively short shrift as
Parliament adopted emergency legislation that
allowed for quick and centralized decision-making
(Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). The proponents of
a greener approach to water management had to
operate very carefully in this situation because their
ideas could easily have been thrown aside. By
cautiously linking their ideas to the public’s desire
for safety and ensuring that their approach would
not be eliminated from official policy documents,
they were able to prevent the pendulum froom
swinging back to earlier policy models.
Other examples of such “framing contests” (Boin
et al. 2009) can be found in the case studies on
Thailand and Hungary. In the Hungarian case study,
the framing contest centered on the causality of the
river floods (Werners et al. 2010): “The cyanide
spill and Bereg flood occurred as parties were
campaigning for the 2002 elections. Whereas the
water authority supported a hard engineering
approach, Bokartisz was advocating its new ideas.
The engineering approach was criticized by the
NGOs and individual scientists for adding to the
flood risk and causing unwanted side-effects in the
region.” The case studies of strategic framing of
disasters show that policy entrepreneurs engaged in
a framing contest over the causality of such disasters
and the desirability of specific policy options but
did not turn to the framing of disasters as lapses of
leadership by responsible authorities. This may be
explained partly by their dependence on the
responsible authorities for achieving change.
Rather, the policy entrepreneurs saw problem
windows primarily as opportunities to launch their
policy alternatives, to stress the merits of those
alternatives, and to position themselves better to
think in line with and cooperate with policy-makers.
The development and marketing of attractive policy
alternatives that take into account the interests of
many stakeholders have taken precedence as the
strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs who are
presented with windows of opportunity.
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Table 2. Windows of opportunity arising in the cases studied.
A. Problem windows
 
Country Problem window analyzed
Mexico Asian financial crisis
China Yangtze River flood 1998
Thailand Financial crisis 1997–98
Upper Ping River flood 2005
Indonesia Financial crisis 1997–98
Severe drought caused by El Niño
Australia Severe drought 1990s
Hungary Tisza River flood 1998, 2001, and 2006
Cyanide spill Tisza River 2000
Turkey Economic crisis of the 1980s
Germany Rhine River flood 1993 and 1995
Elbe and Donau River floods 2002
The Netherlands Sea flood 1953
(Near) Rhine river floods 1993 and 1995
Extreme rainfall 1996 and 1998
B. Political windows
Country Political window analyzed
United States Appointment of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 1993
Mexico Regime change 1990s
Thailand Regime changes 1991, 1997, and 2006
Indonesia Regime change 1998
South Africa Regime change 1994
Hungary Elections 2002 and 2006
Spain Elections 1996 and 2004
Turkey Political crisis of the 1980s
The Netherlands Elections 1973
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In all cases of river floods analyzed, the new
policies, which were adopted afterwards, had been
developed and implemented on a small scale before
the focusing event took place. In the Netherlands,
the regional “Plan Stork” preceded the adoption of
the generic “space for the river” policies (Huitema
and Meijerink 2009b; the Hungarian “Bokartisz
coalition” had gained experience with floodplain
restoration in the Bodrogköz area before this
approach was adopted at the national level (Werners
et al. 2010); and in Germany, floodplain restoration
in Baden-Wuerttemberg and flood risk management
in Rhineland-Palatinate were later taken up at the
national level (Becker 2009). These occurrences fit
perfectly with Kingdon’s multiple streams model,
in which policy alternatives in circulation can be
attached to new problem definitions when a window
opens (Kingdon 1995). They also underscore
Olsson et al.’s (2006) argument that systems need
to be prepared in readiness for change.
Several case studies point to the relevance of crises
outside the realm of nature or even the water
management subsystem. Examples include the
Asian financial crisis (Bhat and Mollinga 2009,
Lebel et al. 2009) or the economic crisis in Turkey
(Kibaroglu et al. 2009). Where floods or natural
disasters offered opportunities to garner active
assistance and encouragement for substantive
policy changes, exploitation of financial and
economic crises aimed primarily to realize change
in water governance, most notably toward
privatization and decentralization.
Political windows also have a role to play in most
of the case studies. Such windows range from those
created by regime change, as in the case studies of
South Africa (Turton 2009), Indonesia (Bhat and
Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), and
Thailand (Lebel et al. 2009), to the change of an
elected government or a single minister, as in the
election of the Den Uyl administration in the
Netherlands in 1973 (Huitema and Meijerink
2009b), the appointment of the Indonesian pro-
reform President Abdurrachmann Wahid (Bhat and
Mollinga 2009), or of Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt in the United States (Ingram and Lejano
2009). Some researchers characterize contemporary
society as postmodern and typified by new modes
of governance and forms of deliberative democracy
that are taking over the central role of traditional
party politics. Many case studies, however,
demonstrate the crucial importance of traditional
party politics, general elections, and changes of
national governments as factors in water policy
transitions. The case study on hydro-politics in
Spain offers a clear example: while the
conservatives insisted on traditional supply-based
solutions to the issue of water shortages, the socialist
party demanded more sustainable alternatives (Font
and Subirats 2010). This is not to say that politics
is the main driver of change; in most cases it is not.
Political changes, however, can offer opportunities
to gain attention for new ideas and to secure a place
for new issues on the political agenda.
Connecting informal to formal networks: the
exploitation, manipulation, and creation of
venues
The transitions analyzed in countries as different as
Indonesia, China, Mexico, and the Netherlands all
feature examples of actors who deliberately
manipulated the composition of advisory or
decision-making forums. In the China case study,
the WWF managed to gain a seat in an influential
national task force on river basin management (te
Boekhorst et al. 2010); a minister in Indonesia
purposefully moved a specific department from one
ministry to another in order to minimize the
influence of the conservative old guard (Bhat and
Mollinga 2009); in Mexico, an environmental
minister engineered the transfer of the national
water commission from the Agriculture and
Fisheries Ministry to the new Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources (Wilder 2010);
and in the Netherlands, decision-making on the
Eastern Scheldt storm surge barrier saw the
government deliberately install an interdisciplinary
advisory commission, thereby breaking the
monopoly of the influential Rijkswaterstaat
engineers (Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Those
who engage in venue manipulation aim to have their
own ideas or their coalition represented where
policy-relevant issues are discussed and to bypass
those who resist the change proposed.
Venue shopping has also proven to be an effective
strategy in several cases. The Spanish case study,
for instance, shows how a coalition of parties
seeking support for alternatives to traditional
supply-based engineering solutions played the
various EU venues successfully; this strategy
increased pressure on the Spanish national
government to change the planned policy program
(Font and Subirats 2010). The need to link various
scales and levels of government is noted by most
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authors. For local initiatives to be scaled up, they
need to be linked to policy arenas on a higher level.
Finally, policy entrepreneurs may deliberately
create new forums to bring people together, often
to discuss problems, as seen for example in the U.
S. case (Ingram and Lejano 2009), and in the
dialogues on water policy in Indonesia that were
organized by international organizations and the
Ford Foundation (Bhat and Mollinga 2009). The
Tanzania case shows that such forums, even if
formally adhering to participatory principles, can
be rigged to produce biases towards certain policy
innovations like the privatization of water services
(Goldin and Kibassa 2009).
Crafting institutions for learning or for
realizing particular policy ideas?
Policy entrepreneurs operate within a particular
institutional setting but may also try to change that
setting. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs in particular
often have numerous opportunities to change the
design of decision-making processes. This raises
questions such as how open or closed is the policy
process? Is the policy process organized as blueprint
planning or as a social learning process? In theory,
bureaucratic change agents may not always direct
change deliberately in one direction but instead
purposefully craft institutions that offer opportunities
for learning, for instance by stimulating a variety of
problem definitions and the development of a
variety of policy options.
Olsson and Galaz (2009), referring to Ostrom
(2005), argue that unicentric, simple, large-scale
governance units do not, and cannot, have the
variety of response capabilities that polycentric,
multi-level governance systems can have.
Awareness of which institutional settings are more
conducive than others to learning may help policy
entrepreneurs create a “learning environment” that
allows for variation and experimentation. From a
normative point of view, we fully agree with the
need for creating institutions that encourage variety
and provide spaces for (social) learning. However,
the case studies show a discrepancy between this
normative ideal and the reality where entrepreneurs
seem to be more interested in institutionalizing their
new policy ideas or ”way of knowing”, that is in
discursive closure (a fixation of meaning), than in
creating a learning environment. Take the various
examples of pilot projects, which sometimes have
an experimental and testing element but more often
are intended to sell a new approach to the public.
Likewise, the existence of multiple venues does not
seem to function primarily as an incentive for
variety and learning; it is probably more realistic to
conceive of venues as arenas where entrepreneurs
try to win (parts of) the multi-level policy game. Put
otherwise, the policy entrepreneurs that we have
studied were more interested in getting their ideas
accepted and institutionalized than in learning. To
that end they tried to gain access to major decision-
making forums, to manipulate forums, and to frame
crises strategically, to build strategic alliances to
pool resources, and they strategically used
narratives to attract supporters. This arsenal of
strategies shows that successful policy entrepreneurs
have played a very political game to institutionalize
their policy ideas. Since those in power can afford
not to learn, a newly established policy monopoly
often is just as stable as the one that was disrupted
or replaced, thus ironically creating barriers to
future change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).
However, if a newly established policy monopoly
displays more characteristics of being sustainable
than the disrupted one, we may well want it to be
stable.
Although we are aware that our findings on the
highly political character of entrepreneurial action
should be explained partly by the specific
conceptual lens (a policy science perspective) that
we have used in our study of water policy
transitions, they may be valuable additions to
insights produced by studies of transitions that have
used other theories or ‘lenses’, such as theories of
social learning and adaptive management.
Strategies to block change
Most of the country analyses related the story of
change agents and their strategies, yet some case
studies present interesting insights into players with
an interest in maintaining the status quo and how
they can try to block change (Kibaroglu et al. 2009).
Most of the strategies discussed above have also
been used to block change and maintain the status
quo. Those resisting change tried to disseminate
their ideas, to build coalitions, and to control the
various decision-making forums. Narrative strategies,
too, found eager users in the no-change camps
(Lebel et al. 2009).
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As discussed above, defenders of the status quo or
those trying to divert new policy can be particularly
successful in the implementation stage. Narain
(2009), Bhat and Mollinga (2009), and Goldin and
Kibassa (2009) all refer to the work of Thomas and
Grindle (1990) on policy implementation, which
maintains that donor organizations have invested
many resources in strengthening policy analysis and
in developing models of “good governance” but
have neglected implementation. Narain (2009)
describes how the street-level bureaucracy of an
irrigation department in India feared the loss of
opportunity to extract illicit payments from farmers
for releasing water. They either withdrew support
for management turnover or tried to delay the
rehabilitation of projects. Large and powerful
farmers who benefited from the status quo, for
example, threatened policy entrepreneurs using
letters and blackmail. Key stakeholders in the South
African mining industry also used an armory of
strategies to block policy change. According to
Turton (2009), they had learned how to
outmaneuver government attempts to regulate the
industry. Tactics included destroying evidence of
liability and/or culpability, attacks on the credibility
of scientists, and provision of inadequate budgets
for public participation processes. The case studies
seem to show that proponents of policy change
typically do not employ underhanded strategies.
Those vested in extant policy have recourse to
actions made possible by the advantages of power
and/or possession, such as bureaucratic delay and
obstruction.
HOW INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
MATTERS
Policy entrepreneurs around the world appear to use
quite similar strategies of coalition-building,
exploitation of problem or political windows, and
venue manipulation and venue shopping. This does
not mean that institutional differences are not
relevant to water policy transitions. The case studies
show that they do, in fact, affect the potential to
achieve a policy transition and for a transition to
endure. Different countries clearly offer individual
or collective entrepreneurs different opportunities
(opportunity structures) to achieve their goals (see
for example Baumgartner et al. 2009). While in
some countries advocates of change may feel
frustrated as they encounter an institutional void and
a lack of opportunity to articulate ideas, those
advocating change in other countries may complain
about institutional complexity. Both an absence and
an abundance of institutions are often said to
constrain the ability of policy entrepreneurs to bring
about a policy transition.
At the same time, these individual institutional
contexts each offer a particular opportunity
structure. Complex decision-making processes in
which many different parties and levels of
government are involved usually feature a wide
range of venues where change agents may place
their issues on the agenda or seek support for their
ideas. As Richardson has argued elsewhere,
alternative venues form an important resource for
interest groups (Richardson 2000). Becker (2009),
in his study on transitions in German flood
management, also correlates multiple venues with
policy entrepreneur opportunity. He argues that the
German federal state structure, precisely because it
offers a large number of venues for simultaneous
discussion of similar issues, acts as fertile ground
for the development of new policy approaches. As
Lebel et al. (2009) in a similar vein conclude, the
studies overall seem to show that an increase in
institutional complexity and redundancy is not
dysfunctional. It rather provides alternative
platforms for deliberation and policy influence at
multiple levels. More centralized and less
democratic government systems, however, offer
other opportunities. Once policy entrepreneurs have
managed to gain access to and support from the
central decision-makers, they may be quite effective
in realizing policy change in such systems (see te
Boekhorst et al. 2010 on China).
The state organization of some countries might
receive criticism for various normative reasons, but
in terms of change management, critiquing is far
less important than knowing a particular system
well and using strategies that fit within the
institutional context. In some cases, however,
institutions can be very constraining, thereby
minimizing chances for entrepreneurial action.
Turton (2009) argues that in most of South African
history, there was no space for individual policy
entrepreneurs. It took the end of the apartheid
regime for possibilities to arise for individual policy
entrepreneurs to make a difference in the
management of mining water.
Ecology and Society 15(2): 21
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art21/
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT
We provide Table 3 as a summary of the main
conclusions of our case study research. The patterns
of continuity and change in water management
show that all transitions exhibit remnants of former
regimes or discourses, and it is clear that a major
policy change does not guarantee successful
implementation (findings 1 and 2).
Some findings of the case studies strongly
corroborate the policy science literature. Findings
on characteristics of policy entrepreneurs (3), on the
use of advocacy and brokerage strategies (6), and
on the need to anticipate windows (9) are in
alignment with Kingdon’s multiple streams model
(Kingdon 1995). Finding 9 supports the argument
of Olsson et al. (2006) that systems need to be
prepared for change. Baumgartner and Jones’s
(1991) concepts of venue manipulation and venue
shopping have been very useful for understanding
change agents’ strategic behavior (finding 10); the
same is true of their conclusion that newly
institutionalized policies (new policy monopolies)
can be just as stable as the ones replaced. Indeed,
policy entrepreneurs usually try to institutionalize
their world view, and as a result, set barriers in place
to future change (finding 11).
Other insights, such as the importance of collective
entrepreneurship (finding 4), the need for context-
dependent balancing between top-down and
bottom-up strategies (finding 5), the usefulness of
network-building across different ways of knowing
water (finding 7), and the possibilities for strategic
use of narratives (finding 8), were derived from the
case study material more inductively.
As mentioned above, there are similarities but also
some notable differences between low-income,
middle-income, and high-income countries when it
comes to identifying policy entrepreneurs and their
strategies. In low- and middle- income countries,
donor organizations are important policy
entrepreneurs. They have succeeded in changing
governance paradigms almost overnight in many
cases, but implementation following such change
tells a different story (finding 2). The
implementation of major policy change appears to
be a challenge in all cases studied, which fits well
with principal findings of other research on policy
implementation (for example, Pressman and
Wildawsky 1973; Thomas and Grindle 1990).
Our final finding pinpoints the need for policy
entrepreneurs to adjust their strategies to the
particular institutional context in which they are
operating. Different institutional contexts produce
not only different institutional constraints but also
different opportunity structures. Change agents
need to be able to recognize and exploit the
opportunities and peculiarities of a particular
institutional system (finding 12).
What are the implications of these findings for those
who aim to direct change? The in-depth case studies
on the roles and strategies of policy entrepreneurs
have contributed to our knowledge about the
complexity of change trajectories. With this
knowledge, a policy entrepreneur may be able to
turn a “trained eye” on newly developing change
processes, to evaluate and interpret them, and to
recognize opportunities for change and their
characteristics. Examination of policy transitions
must account for their intrinsically dynamic nature.
“The experience of managing in complex adaptive
systems is more similar to catching waves or looking
for emergent corridors for action than pulling strings
or working levers” (Westley 2002, p. 354). A simple
list of “do’s and don’ts” would not do justice to the
case analyses. Nevertheless, we cannot resist the
temptation to formulate some general recommendations
for those who seek to direct policy change:
 
1. Develop a thorough knowledge of the
characteristics and peculiarities of the
relevant institutional system. This step is
necessary to be able to recognize and
characterize opportunities and to assess the
likely effectiveness of specific change
strategies.
 
2. Persevere and be willing to spend resources,
especially time, to see a transition process
through to implementation.
 
3. Attract supporters to the policy alternatives
and build coalitions. Strike a balance between
advocacy and brokerage strategies. Negotiation
and compromise can be as important as
communication of the new ideas.
 
4. Recognize the various ways of knowing
water. Frame the problem and develop the
narrative strategy around those that fit the
institutional and social context.
 
5. Anticipate windows of opportunity, whether
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Table 3. Findings on water policy transitions, policy entrepreneurs, and change strategies: lessons learned.
On patterns of change
1 New policy ideas (paradigms, discourses, or ways of knowing) do not replace the “old” ones, rather they are
placed alongside them or are integrated with them.
2 After new policies have been adopted, those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo have ample
opportunities to delay or frustrate policy implementation.
On policy entrepreneurs
3 Policy entrepreneurs can be found anywhere, but what they have in common is a good reputation within their
respective communities, good networking skills, and perseverance.
4 Successful entrepreneurship often is collective entrepreneurship in which individuals play complementary roles.
On strategies (and institutions)
5 A combination of bottom-up and top-down strategies makes most transitions happen, and their relative importance
depends largely on the particular institutional context or opportunity structure.
6 Successful (individual or collective) entrepreneurs are able to balance advocacy and brokerage strategies.
7 Successful policy entrepreneurs build networks across different ways of knowing water (different meanings).
8 Successful policy entrepreneurs use narratives to frame issues strategically and thereby justify change and attract
supporters.
9 Successful policy entrepreneurs anticipate windows of opportunity by developing and testing attractive policy
alternatives and demonstrating their feasibility.
10 Successful policy entrepreneurs employ strategies of venue manipulation and venue-shopping, and/or create new
venues to be able to insert new ideas into decision-making processes.
11 Successful policy entrepreneurs manage to institutionalize new ideas (discourses, images, or ways of knowing),
and in this way create barriers to future change.
12 Successful policy entrepreneurs have a full and thorough knowledge of the institutional system they are working
in and know how to use that system.
they are opened by shock events or by
political changes. Be prepared to exploit these
opportunities and to insert the new ideas into
the political debate. Pilot projects are useful
for demonstrating feasibility but should not
exclude experimentation and testing.
 
6. Play a political game. Issues or disasters need
to be framed strategically. Forums may
require manipulation, and forum-shopping
can be necessary in order to bypass change
blockers.
RESEARCH AGENDA
We hope that additional effort will take the research
past the limits of this case study research. A useful
next step would be a systematic test of one or more
hypotheses on the strategies used by policy
entrepreneurs. All findings, as summarized in Table
3, can also be read as hypotheses that need further
testing and refinement in a broader range of cases.
A most different systems approach, as we have
applied in this comparative case analysis, has
proven useful in testing a causal relationship across
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various contexts, and may be used in a similar vein
for further testing of more specific causal
relationships, such as between a specific change
strategy (for example, the framing of policy
windows) and policy change. A complementary
approach would be a most similar systems approach
that aims at explaining different outcomes (in our
case, either major policy change or stability) within
very similar systems (Anckar 2008).
We see three research topics as particularly fruitful:
the nature of coalitions and the art of coalition-
building, the interaction between agency and
windows of opportunity, and change strategies in
low- and middle-income countries. In terms of
framing the research, a great deal of conceptual
work needs to be done in the policy sciences.
In this article we have made an analytical distinction
between three types of coalitions: those based on
shared world views or meanings, those formed
around shared policy preferences (strategic
alliances), and those centered on resource
dependencies. But how do policy entrepreneurs
choose which of these types to build, and when, and
by using which strategies? We have seen, for
example, how policy entrepreneurs may try to
bridge and relate multiple ways of knowing water
(meanings), which is an example of policy
brokering. However, they may also use narrative
strategies for advocacy and to attract supporters.
How do entrepreneurs balance advocacy and
brokerage strategies? What makes them select a
particular strategy or a combination of strategies?
These kinds of questions go beyond an explanatory
typology of strategies related to policy transition
and could further guide the work of policy
entrepreneurs.
Policy entrepreneurs need opportunities in the form
of problem and political windows to get their new
policy ideas and plans accepted and realized. We
have learned that both anticipating windows and the
framing or “painting” of windows can be effective
strategies. The cases show, however, that usually it
is a combination or a series of windows that
produces a real opening for change. More research
is needed on how policy entrepreneurs exploit
windows of opportunity that open simultaneously
or successively.
One of the striking observations in the case studies
is the failure of implementation in most water policy
transitions in low- and middle-income countries.
Donor agencies, such as the World Bank, face huge
difficulties in implementing new governance
models, such as the concept of water user
associations. The burning question, then, is whether
more practical alternatives can be developed. Which
policies fit better with the institutional
characteristics of these societies? Would it be more
fruitful to build on existing institutional capacity
rather than assuming the need for a new institution
to take on the task of implementation? Would a
leave-alone strategy be effective? Case-by-case
responses to such questions might lead to more
successful implementation.
Confusion and overlap are rife in regard to concepts
in the policy science literature. In our research we
have grouped concepts that show considerable
overlap, such as the concepts of frames, narratives,
and ways of knowing. This rough grouping of
theories and concepts works for our analysis but
clearly entails an interesting theoretical research
agenda. How do these concepts relate to each other,
how exactly do they differ, and when do these
differences prove useful? This kind of conceptual
research would help to develop a theory on (the
management of) water policy transitions.
We very much hope that the case analyses, the
findings, and research agenda will stimulate others
to further investigate the strategies of policy
entrepreneurs in realizing water policy transitions.
In this way we also hope to be of some help to those
engaged in bringing about improvements that are so
urgently needed globally in fresh water
management.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art21/
responses/
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